Peri Theon: The Renaissance Confronts the Gods by MacPhail, Eric
 
Indiana University Bloomington,             Philosophical Readings XI.2 (2019), pp. 63-67. 
Bloomington, Indiana                DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.2554104 
email: macphai@indiana.edu 
 
Peri Theôn: The Renaissance Confronts the Gods 
 
Eric MacPhail 
 
 
Abstract: This essay traces the legacy of the ancient 
Greek sophists in the European Renaissance with particu-
lar attention to the study of religion as a human institu-
tion. Vernacular writers such as Niccolò Machiavelli and 
Michel de Montaigne follow the lead of the sophists in 
their effort to bring religion into the field of social 
thought. Montaigne himself offers a particularly interest-
ing variation on the sole remaining fragment of Pro-
tagoras of Abdera’s Peri theon. In this way, these thinkers 
inscribe themselves in a genealogy of sophistic that con-
tinues from Classical Greece to the Enlightenment. 
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In The Greeks and the Irrational, E. R. Dodds explains 
that the Enlightenment did not begin with the sophists. 
“The Enlightenment is of course much older” (180). For 
students of European history, this chronology of enlight-
enment is hardly a matter of course. Yet within classical 
studies and the history of ancient thought, it is standard 
usage, more so in the Germanic languages than in the 
Romance languages,1 to designate the latter half of the 
fifth century as either the Greek Enlightenment, the Soph-
istic Enlightenment, or even, in at least one instance, the 
Euripidean Enlightenment. This usage developed in the 
wake of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment in order to 
identify some trans-historical affinities between the lead-
ing thinkers of the Periclean Age and the modern Enlight-
enment philosophers. These affinities are broadly sub-
sumed under the headings of rationalism and atheism. As 
applied to the ancient world, Enlightenment involves a 
rationalist critique of traditional values in the context of 
some political crisis or revolution. Characteristic is the 
view of Friedrich Solmsen: “The Greek Enlightenment of 
the fifth century B.C., also known as the Rationalistic 
Movement or the Age of the Sophists, is generally associ-
ated with progressive or revolutionary ideas and even 
more, perhaps, with their negative correlate, the question-
ing of time-honored beliefs and values” (3). This para-
digm can apply to other times and places than ancient 
Greece and eighteenth-century Europe, and, at the limit, 
can serve to organize a comprehensive history of human 
civilization such as the East German scholar Hermann 
Ley’s multivolume study on Enlightenment and Atheism, 
whose title is meant to be redundant.  The protagonists of 
the Greek Enlightenment are the sophists, whose collec-
tive identity is professional rather than ideological, but 
whose fame and infamy spring from their corrosive chal-
lenge to traditional values and beliefs and from their ex-
clusive focus on human society and what we may call, in 
retrospect, the human sciences.  
It must be stressed at the outset, not only of this inter-
vention but also of our larger research project, that the 
unity of the sophists cannot derive from their coherence 
as a philosophical school or their adherence to any com-
mon doctrinal system. Moreover, it was Hermann Diels 
and Walther Kranz who defined the corpus of the sophists 
through the successive editions of their monumental an-
thology, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (DK), even 
though the sophists are not really presocratic in any mean-
ingful sense of the term. Therefore, the status of the soph-
ists as an object of inquiry meets with some resistance 
among historians of philosophy. Rather than form a dis-
tinct school of thought, sophistic can be understood as the 
natural expression of a new consciousness of the prob-
lems of social life in late fifth-century Greece. The 
scholar most closely associated with this approach is 
Mario Untersteiner, a leading editor and commentator of 
the sophists. Following in the same tradition, Giovanni 
Reale sees the sophists as the exponents of a new cultural 
paradigm that supplants the prior cultural paradigm of 
natural philosophy with a countervailing interest in an-
thropology (Reale, 17-19). My own point of emphasis is 
how the sophists, and their heirs and successors in subse-
quent eras, bring religion itself into the field of social 
thought. 
The paradigmatic figure in this regard is Protagoras of 
Abdera, who is credited with authoring the first treatise 
ever written on the gods or peri theon. Coming on the 
heels of a long tradition of natural philosophy represented 
by works entitled peri phuseos, Protagoras’ Peri theon 
marks a change of emphasis which is all the more re-
markable in so far as Protagoras does not really seem to 
be interested in theology. The Peri theon is a very con-
venient work to analyze since all that remains is the open-
ing sentence, and, as we know, the shorter the fragment, 
the longer the commentary. Diogenes Laertius and other 
doxographers conserve Protagoras’ opening words, with 
slight variations, as “regarding the gods, I do not know if 
they exist or if they do not exist or what form they have, 
for human life is short and the subject is obscure” (DK 
80B4).2 As many scholars have remarked, this is not a 
very promising beginning for a treatise on the gods, and 
some have even wondered if Protagoras really wrote a 
book on the gods that seems to disavow its subject matter 
from the outset (Fritz, 920). One hypothesis offered by 
historians of ancient philosophy is that Protagoras must 
have rehearsed arguments for and against theism or belief 
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in the gods in accordance with the spirit of his Antilogiai 
or opposing speeches, a work attested in Diogenes Laer-
tius’ Lives of the Philosophers (9.55).3 Some have even 
reconstructed these opposing arguments from the 
doxographic surveys in Cicero’s De natura deorum and 
Sextus Empiricus’ Adversus Mathematicos (Gigon). One 
weakness of this hypothesis is that Sextus classifies Pro-
tagoras among the dogmatic atheists, who argued on one 
side of the question, not both. I prefer to follow a different 
but no less authoritative conjecture, which was developed 
by Rodolfo Mondolfo on the basis of a suggestion by 
Werner Jaeger. 
In 1936 Jaeger delivered a series of lectures in Eng-
lish, which were later published under the title The Theol-
ogy of the Early Greek Philosophers, of which the last 
chapter or last lecture is on the sophists. Jaeger recognizes 
the sophists as, essentially, the first social scientists of re-
ligion. For the sophists, the study of religion belongs to 
the study of man, and so Jaeger declares, “But the real 
fathers of rational anthropology are the fifth-century 
Sophists. In this respect they resemble the philosophers of 
the modern Enlightenment, who perform a similar func-
tion and have many close points of contact with them” 
(175). This is the phrase that caught the eye of Frank 
Manuel and supposedly gave him the idea for his ground 
breaking study, The Eighteenth Century Confronts the 
Gods, to which my own title alludes. “The idea for the 
study first occurred to me while reading Werner Jaeger’s 
description of ancient rationalistic theory in The Theology 
of the Early Greek Philosophers. The affinity between 
Sophist and Enlightenment thought, to which Professor 
Jaeger there alludes in passing, challenged me” (Manuel, 
vii). Thus my essay situates itself in a genealogy of soph-
istic from Classical Greece to the Enlightenment via the 
Renaissance. Jaeger credits the sophists with reorienting 
the object of philosophical inquiry from objective know-
ledge of divine essence, such as the natural philosophers 
sought, to human subjectivity, by analyzing man himself. 
In particular, he highlights the role of Protagoras of Ab-
dera, who looks upon religion as an anthropological fact 
to be understood in the light of its origin and function in 
human society.4 
This is the viewpoint that Rodolfo Mondolfo seized 
upon in his magisterial study of the human subject in 
classical antiquity, first composed in Spanish and best 
known in its Italian version, La comprensione del sog-
getto umano nell’antichità classica. In a chapter on the 
subjectivization of religious representations, Mondolfo 
rehearses Jaeger’s argument and applies it more particu-
larly to Protagoras’ enigmatic treatise Peri theon, whose 
first and, for posterity, last sentence seems to foreclose 
any sequel or even any content. If Protagoras does not 
want to say whether the gods exist or not or in what form, 
what is left to talk about? The only thing left to discuss, 
Mondolfo insinuates, are the motives and the function of 
religious belief in human society (Mondolfo, 95-96). No 
more prudent than his fellow classicists, Mondolfo insists 
that Protagoras must have asked, why do people believe 
in the gods, and, following the utilitarian bent of sophistic 
thought, how can society use religion to its own advan-
tage?  Other sophists dealt with these same questions, in-
cluding Critias in the famous Sisyphus fragment con-
served by Sexus Empiricus in book nine of his Adversus 
Mathematicos (DK 88B25).5 To confirm Critias’s creden-
tials as an atheist, Sextus cites a dramatic poem (else-
where identified as the tragedy of Sisyphus by Euripides) 
where one of the characters, perhaps the protagonist 
Sisyphus, explains the invention of religion as a political 
expedient. In the beginning men lived a beastly and dis-
ordered life, with no reward for virtue or punishment of 
vice, until laws were passed to punish crime and secure 
justice. Since law deterred overt but not covert crime, 
some ingenious and prudent man first invented the fear of 
gods and persuaded others to believe in an eternal power 
that sees everything we do, hears everything we say, and 
even knows our secret thoughts so that no misdeed can 
escape detection. Moreover, this invention is explicitly 
acknowledged to be a lie, a ψεῦδος λόγος, or falsa ora-
tio for Gentian Hervet, the Renaissance translator. Thus 
the Sisyphus fragment, which enjoyed a fairly wide diffu-
sion in Greek, Latin, and, in condensed form, even in 
French in the late sixteenth century, represents religion as 
a surveillance system that supplements the law and limits 
the scope for undetected crime.6 God is assigned the role 
of the ἐπίσκοπός or inspector rerum whose all-
encompassing view keeps everyone in line at least until 
they realize that it’s all a hoax. This theory of religion ne-
cessarily seems irreligious, since to explain the instru-
mental value of religious belief is to undermine such be-
lief. 
Roman state religion seems to have been the heir to 
this legacy of sophistic thought, at least according to the 
testimony of Marcus Varro conserved in Saint Augus-
tine’s City of God. Augustine quotes Varro to the effect 
that, as there are some truths which it is not useful for the 
people to know, so there are some falsehoods which it is 
expedient to believe, including the belief that some men 
are born from the gods (Varro 23).7 Presumably, Varro 
would have counted his own understanding of religion as 
one of the truths best concealed from the people. Cicero 
largely endorses this understanding of the political expe-
diency of religion in the De natura deorum through the 
role of C. Aurelius Cotta, who, though a priest, allows 
himself to doubt in private conversation or in consessu 
what he affirms in public speech or in contione (1.61).8 
Apparently Cotta is the better able to perform his func-
tions as a priest because he does not really believe in the 
gods. Ironically, it is Cotta who denounces the Epicureans 
as atheists who eradicate religion from the minds of men 
(De natura deorum 1.121). What is the difference, he 
asks, between Epicurus and other atheists like Diagoras, 
Theodorus, Protagoras, or the author of the Sisyphus:  
 
Ii qui dixerunt totam de dis inmortalibus opinionem fictam esse 
ab hominibus sapientibus rei publicae causa, ut quos ratio non 
posset eos ad officium religio duceret, nonne omnem religionem 
funditus sustulerunt? (De natura deorum 1.118)  
 
Those who have said that the whole idea of the immortal gods 
was made up by wise men for the sake of the republic, so that 
those whom reason cannot guide to duty, religion would, have 
they not completely eradicated all religion? 
 
This is Cicero’s paraphrase of the Sisyphus fragment, 
which he denounces precisely because it is true, and some 
truths should never be acknowledged in public. Rather 
than writing a play for the theater, Critias would have 
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been better off writing a dialogue for his friends. All these 
figures from Critias to Cicero are precursors to our Soph-
istic Renaissance. 
Following this genealogy, we may ask the question, 
where in Renaissance literature, in Latin or the vernacu-
lar, can we hear an echo of Protagoras’ Peri theon? Who 
else, in the wake of Protagoras, thinks that life is too short 
for theology but just right for the sociology of religion?9 I 
propose to turn first to a figure who took an unseemly in-
terest in how religion was used in Republican Rome and 
misused in Renaissance Italy, namely Niccolò Machia-
velli, my first candidate for the invidious title of Renais-
sance sophist. In the first book of the Discorsi, Machia-
velli devotes a series of chapters to a scandalously con-
vincing appraisal of Roman religion as a triumph of state-
craft and a complete imposture (Discorsi I, 11-15).10 
Machiavelli admires the ancient Romans for using reli-
gion to promote civic order and military discipline, and he 
insinuates that Roman religion was successful because the 
people believed in it and the ruling class did not (Discorsi 
I, 12). In this way, ancient Rome and its class conflicts 
exemplify the crucial tension between belief and under-
standing: religious belief obscures understanding and 
understanding dissipates belief. In this dichotomy, the 
author of the Discorsi obviously identifies with the inter-
preters of religion, as John Najemy calls them, rather than 
with the believers. In short, with Machiavelli we witness 
the modern instauration of a resolutely non-theological 
approach to religion. 
Where else can we find in Renaissance literature a 
modern adaptation of the Peri theon? Who follows next in 
the wake of Protagoras? My main candidate for the dubi-
ous distinction of Renaissance sophist, and one who cer-
tainly knew Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of the Philosophers, 
is the French Renaissance prose writer and inventor of the 
essay form, Michel de Montaigne. The question of Mon-
taigne’s relationship to sophistic has already been raised 
and answered rather categorically by François Rigolot in 
an article on Montaigne and rhetoric. “La position de 
Montaigne vis-à-vis de la sophistique ne fait aucun 
doute,” he says. “Chez lui comme chez la plupart de ses 
contemporains--on pense surtout à Érasme--le terme est 
toujours pris dans un sens dépréciatif” (80). This is all the 
more true if we take the term “sophistic” to be a synonym 
of “scholastic,” which I do not.11 Rather, leaving aside the 
question of Montaigne and rhetoric, which as Rigolot ac-
knowledges is not simply a question of antagonism, I 
want to situate Montaigne in relation to sophistic social 
thought. I will begin with Montaigne’s essay on custom, 
“De la coustume et de ne changer aisément une loy reçue” 
(I, 23), which merits close attention for its contribution to 
the “functional analysis of religion”12 which extends 
throughout Montaigne’s essays. Ostensibly devoted to the 
tyranny of custom and the arbitrary authority of the law, 
while advocating the strictest adherence to law and cus-
tom, before recognizing in civil war an exception to its 
own rule, “De la coustume” revisits the prototypically 
sophistic distinction between nomos and physis or law 
and nature.13 Montaigne could have encountered this fa-
miliar topos in the dialogues of Xenophon and Plato if not 
in the less accessible, or in the case of Antiphon, inacces-
sible fragments of the sophists themselves. 
Following a long enumeration of diverse and, for a 
European audience, perverse customs illustrative of the 
relativity of cultural values, Montaigne argues that our 
very morality or the distinctions we draw between right 
and wrong are conventional rather than natural. “Les loix 
de la conscience, que nous disons naistre de nature, nais-
sent de la coustume: chacun ayant en veneration interne 
les opinions et moeurs approuvées et receuës autour de 
luy, ne s’en peut desprendre sans remors, ny s’y appliquer 
sans applaudissement” (I, 23, 115 C).14 This issue con-
tinued to preoccupy Montaigne as he revised his essay on 
the Exemplaire de Bordeaux until his death in 1592, add-
ing the concrete example of a virtue that is conventional 
rather than natural: “la pudicité” or pudicitia. Writing in 
the margins of his own copy of the 1588 edition of the 
Essais, after attributing to Plato himself the notion that 
sexual mores are conventional rather than natural, Mon-
taigne declares: “De vrai, la pudicité est une belle vertu, 
et de laquelle l’utilité est assez connue: mais de la traitter 
et faire valoir selon nature, il est autant malaysé, comme 
il est aisé de la faire valoir selon l’usage, les loix et les 
preceptes” (I, 23, 117 C). Here Montaigne renders the 
second term of the Physis / Nomos dichotomy with three 
vernacular terms: “l’usage, les loix et les preceptes.” Like 
the sophists, then, Montaigne classifies law and morality 
under the heading of nomos. However, as Aldo Magris 
reminds us in his article on Greek Enlightenment, to rec-
ognize that morality is conventional is not to minimize its 
importance, nor is it, by any means, subversive: “Anche 
la morale, dunque, è una costruzione umana, ed una con-
venzione, ma ciò non toglie per nulla la sua importanza, 
dato che questa importanza si misura sulla sua utilità 
sociale” (248). Jacqueline de Romilly makes very much 
the same point in her analysis of the sophistic critique of 
the law (93). For Montaigne, as a sophist, the law is valid 
because it is conventional; it is a convention entered into 
for the mutual benefit of society. This can explain, I be-
lieve, why such a caustic critique of custom yields such a 
classic expression of conservatism in “De la coustume”: 
“Car c’est la regle des regles, et generale loy des loix, que 
chacun observe celles du lieu où il est” (I, 23, 118 A).15 
The only general law he recognizes is the need to obey 
our own laws and to honor our own customs.  
Moreover, the convention that most appeals to Mon-
taigne, and that he most strongly urges his audience to 
respect, is the Catholic religion. The French are Catholic 
by convention, and they would do well to remain so, is 
the burden of his essay on custom. When he does speak of 
Christianity in this essay, he offers a very unorthodox en-
dorsement: “La religion Chrestienne a toutes les marques 
d’extreme justice et utilité; mais nulle plus apparente, que 
l’exacte recommendation de l’obéissance du Magistrat, et 
manutention des polices” (I, 23, 120 B). Here the criterion 
of utility completely displaces the question of truth.16 In 
that respect, Machiavelli and Montaigne invoke the same 
criterion but arrive at opposite conclusions in their evalu-
ation of Christianity. 
Montaigne further inscribes himself in the sophistic 
tradition through his very keen insight into what we may 
call the psychology of superstition, which is related to the 
faculty of the imagination. In his essay, from the first 
book, on the force of the imagination (I, 21), Montaigne 
compiles a leisurely sequence of anecdotes involving 
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what we might call psychosomatic ailments, illustrative of 
the power of the human imagination. The initial version 
of the essay includes a rather categorical statement of ra-
tionalism, the feature most emblematic of the sophistic 
enlightenment. “Il est vray semblable que le principal 
credit des miracles, des visions, des enchantemens et de 
tels effects extraordinaires, vienne de la puissance de 
l’imagination agissant principalement contre les ames du 
vulgaire, plus molles. On leur a si fort saisi la creance, 
qu’ils pensent voir ce qu’ils ne voyent pas” (I, 21, 99 A). 
It is most likely, Montaigne declares, that the credit we 
give to miracles, visions, enchantments, and other extra-
ordinary effects comes from the power of the imagination 
acting primarily on the minds of the common people, 
whose credulity is so far preoccupied, “si fort saisi,” that 
they think they see what they do not see. Therefore the 
category of the supernatural is a subjective representation 
rather than an objective reality. In revising his essay, 
Montaigne added a comic anecdote about a friend of his 
who suffered from sexual impotence on his wedding night 
and who was cured by a psychological ruse, which Mon-
taigne does not hesitate to call a “miracle” (I, 21, 100 C), 
that exploited the friend’s belief in sorcery and more par-
ticularly in the type of magic spell that the French call 
“les nouements d’aiguillettes.” It is clear that the essay on 
the imagination inscribes itself in a very specific ideo-
logical context, namely, the vogue of demonology and the 
persecution of witches in late Renaissance Europe (Na-
kam, 377-97). In this context, Montaigne’s aristocratic 
friend was no more able than the common people to resist 
the lure of superstition. 
The very same year that Montaigne published the first 
two books of Essays in 1580, Jean Bodin published his 
fanatical treatise De la démonomanie des sorciers where 
he strenuously rebuts the kind of rationalist arguments 
that Montaigne uses to explain belief in witches. Among 
other details, he adds juridical testimony to defend belief 
in “les nouements d’aiguillettes” that Montaigne demysti-
fies (Bodin, 182). Moreover, Bodin draws a very impru-
dent connection between religious orthodoxy and demo-
nology. In the appendix to his work that he calls “Réfuta-
tion des opinions de Jean Wier,” aimed at the physician 
Johann Weyer, whose treatise De praestigiis daemonum 
appeared in 1563, supplemented by the De Lamiis in 
1577, Bodin insists that to refute sorcery, as Weyer and 
Montaigne and some others do, is to refute religion. If 
sorcery isn’t real, then god isn’t real (Bodin, 469, 475). 
Bodin goes so far as to assert, against Weyer, that lycan-
thropy is just as certain as holy scripture: “Et en asseurant 
que le changement des Sorciers en loups, et autres bestes 
est fabuleux, et que c’est une illusion, il faict une conclu-
sion que l’histoire sacree est une fable et illusion, car s’il 
est fait en l’un, il se peut faire és autres, attendu que la 
puissance de Dieu n’est point diminuee” (475). This was 
immediately recognized as a dangerously inept approach 
to Christian apologetics, in fact so inept that it was open 
to suspicion of clandestine atheism.17 Whatever his secret 
motives may have been, Bodin does profess an absolute, 
literal belief in sorcery and witchcraft. For Bodin, who 
was primarily a jurist, what counts in this debate is the 
legal procedure used to prosecute witches. The guilty ver-
dict is the goal of his book. 
By contrast, Montaigne remains an agnostic on the objec-
tive question of guilt or innocence. Rather than render a 
verdict on the truth status of the examples he adduces, 
Montaigne prefers, in uncertain cases like the famous trial 
of Martin Guerre, to follow the model of the Areopagus, 
which, according to Valerius Maximus, deferred judge-
ment on a capital case for one hundred years in order to 
avoid an “inexplicabilem cunctationem” (8.1.2) or insol-
uble dilemma. In witch trials, Montaigne wishes the court 
could simply declare, “La court n’y entend rien” (III, 11, 
1030). In this way the essayist shuns what Andrea Frisch 
has called “the tribunal of history” and seeks instead to 
defuse the prosecutorial zeal of his contemporary French 
historians. 
In his essay on the force of the imagination, Mon-
taigne takes a rather casual attitude to the veracity of the 
anecdotes which he recounts, including the one about the 
falconer who made a bird fall from the sky merely by 
staring at it, “à ce qu’on dit” or according to hearsay (I, 
21, 105 A). In revising his essay, Montaigne magnified 
this aspect of hearsay, insisting that he does not care if his 
examples of the power of the imagination are true or 
false. Verification and falsification are not the purpose of 
his book, which he defines as follows, in a key passage 
for understanding the essays: “Aussi en l’estude que je 
traitte de noz moeurs et mouvemens, les tesmoignages 
fabuleux, pourveu qu’ils soient possibles, y servent 
comme les vrais. Advenu ou non advenu, à Paris ou à 
Rome, à Jean ou à Pierre, c’est tousjours un tour de 
l’humaine capacité, duquel je suis utilement advisé par ce 
recit” (I, 21, 105 C). First of all, the project of Mon-
taigne’s essays is anthropological: he studies human 
mores (nomoi we might say) and movements. Primary 
among these “moeurs et mouvemens” is human credulity, 
our impulse to believe in the supernatural and the divine. 
It is indifferent to this study whether our beliefs are true 
or false, as long as they are useful, and as long as we 
grasp the use to which they are put in society. Therefore, 
he dismisses the objective question: do witches exist, are 
they guilty or innocent, “advenu ou non advenu”? In this 
question, that Montaigne refuses to answer, that he leaves 
in suspense at the end of his essay on the force of the im-
agination, I propose to hear an echo of the question that 
Protagoras puts aside at the outset of his Peri theon: the 
question of whether the gods exist. We do not know what 
Protagoras said next, because his text has been lost and 
perhaps suppressed by subsequent orthodoxies. However, 
we do know what our Renaissance authors wrote, and 
through our collective efforts, we may be able to retrieve 
some of the fugitive legacy of the sophists from the sub-
stantial remains of the European Renaissance. 
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Notes 
 
1 The usage is not unknown in the Romance languages. See Saitta as 
well as Magris. 
2 The fragment is conserved in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philoso-
phers 9.52; Eusebius of Caesarea, Praeparatio Evangelica 14.3.7; and 
Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 9.56. 
3 This hypothesis was first proposed by Gomperz, 133-34. Untersteiner 
1, 55 considers Peri theon to be the first section of the Antilogiai. 
4 Summarizing Jaeger, 189, Babut says of Protagoras, “il est vraisem-
blable qu’il y appréciait positivement le fait religieux en tant que phé-
nomène social et élément important de la culture humaine” (56). 
5 See Davies for text, translation, commentary, and bibliography. 
 
 
6 Sextus’s Adversus Mathematicos, including the long version of the 
Sisyphus fragment, was first printed in Latin translation in Paris and 
Antwerp in 1569 while the shorter version of the fragment, attributed to 
Euripides, was found in the De placitis philosophorum included in Plu-
tarch’s Moralia and thus translated into French in 1572 by Jacques Am-
yot. The editio princeps of the Moralia was published by Aldo Manuzio 
in Venice in 1509. 
7 Montaigne paraphrases Varro’s opinion in the “Apologie de Raymond 
Sebond”: “Voicy l’excuse que nous donnent, sur la consideration de ce 
subject, Scevola, grant pontife, et Varro, grand theologien, en leur 
temps: Qu’il est besoin que le peuple ignore beaucoup de choses vrayes 
et en croye beaucoup de fausses” (II, 12, 535). 
8 On this point, see André. 
9 Magris paraphrases the end of DK 80B4 as follows: “la vita umana è 
troppo breve e troppo preziosa per sprecarla in tali questioni; meglio 
dunque impiegare il proprio tempo nella soluzione di problemi piú utili” 
(221). 
10 For an analysis of these chapters, see Sasso, 549-560. Sasso anticipa-
tes, in order to contradict, my thesis when he argues that Machiavelli’s 
concept of religion has only extrinsic connections with ancient sophistic: 
“E come il concetto che egli ne costruisce ha riscontri soltanto estrinseci 
con, poniamo, le antiche teorizzazioni sofistiche, così non ne ha alcuno 
con l’atteggiamento che predominò nel periodo della Controriforma” 
(553-554). 
11 For the use of the term sophist to designate the scholastic philosophers 
and professors of dialectic, see MacPhail 2011, 52-58. 
12 The term is taken from Machiavelli criticism, especially Preus. Before 
Preus, Tenenti focused his discussion of Machiavelli’s religion on “la 
sua analisi funzionale delle credenze religiose” (715). MacPhail 2014 
studies Montaigne’s functional analysis of religion with particular refe-
rence to the essay “De la gloire” (II, 16). 
13 For a general treatment of the theme, see Heinimann as well as Gu-
thrie, 55-134. 
14 The essays are cited by book, chapter, and page and also layer: A, B, 
or C for 1580, 1588, or the Exemplaire de Bordeaux. 
15 See Langer for the tension between conservatism and critique in I, 23. 
16 Similarly, Mathieu-Castellani: “l’utile se trouve privilégié par rapport 
à l’authentique” (10). 
17 The seventeenth-century libertine Guy Patin bears an interesting te-
stimony to Bodin’s posthumous reputation for atheism and religious 
hypocrisy in a letter dated November 16, 1643: “La Démonomanie des 
Sorciers de Bodin ne vaut rien du tout. Il ne fit ce livre qu’afin qu’on 
crût qu’il y croyait, d’autant que, pour quelques opinions un peu libres, 
il fut soupçonné d’athéisme, parce qu’il favorisa les huguenots” (304). 
